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MOBIL V. VENEZUELA: THE NATIONALITY REQUIREMENT UNDER THE ICSID 
CONVENTION 
By 




 On June 10, 2010, an arbitral tribunal constituted under the auspices of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“Centre”), in 
accordance with the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention”),1 
rendered a decision on jurisdiction in the case of Mobil Corporation and others v. 
Venezuela (“Mobil”).2 The relevance of this decision lies in the fact that it was the 
first time that an ICSID tribunal expressly decided that, for the purposes of 
establishing the jurisdiction of the Centre, the Contracting States of the ICSID 
Convention are free to determine the nationality of juridical persons pursuant to a 
nationality criterion other than the place of incorporation or seat test. Until the 
Mobil decision was rendered, ICSID tribunals that were required to decide on the 
fulfillment of the nationality requirement set forth in Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention had invariably applied the place of incorporation or seat test in order to 
determine the nationality of juridical persons.3 
                                                 
∗ Roberto Castro de Figueiredo holds an LL.B. (PUC, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), Dip. Public 
International Law (University of Vienna, Austria), LL.M. International Dispute Resolution 
(CEPMLP, University of Dundee, UK), Ph.D. candidate (Queen Mary, University of 
London, UK). The author may be contacted at robertofigueiredo@sbadv.com.br. 
1 Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States of March 18, 1965, 575 UNTS 159, reprinted in 1 ICSID Reports 
3 (1993) (entered into force October 14, 1966). 
2 Mobil Corporation, Venezuela Holdings, B.V., Mobil Cerro Negro Holding, Ltd., Mobil 
Venezolana de Petróleos Holdings, Inc., Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd., and Mobil Venezolana 
de Petróleos, Inc. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction of 
June 10, 2010 (Gilbert Guillaume, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, and Ahmed Sadek El-
Kosheri). 
3 CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, LORETTA MALINTOPPI, AUGUST REINISCH, & ANTHONY 
SINCLAIR, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 281 (Cambridge University Press, 
2nd ed. 2009). 
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The controversy that led to the decision on jurisdiction in the Mobil case 
arose out of the nationality criteria set forth in the Agreement on Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
and the Republic of Venezuela of October 22, 1991 (“Netherlands-Venezuela 
BIT”),4 which served as one of the basis for the submission of the dispute to the 
jurisdiction of the Centre. Pursuant to its Article 1(b), in addition to the place of 
incorporation test, juridical persons are also deemed to have the nationality of a 
party to the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT if they are controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by natural persons having the nationality of that contracting party or by 
juridical persons constituted under the laws of that contracting party.5 Venezuela 
argued, however, that four of the six claimants — two incorporated in the United 
States and two in the Bahamas — could not rely on this provision of the 
Netherlands-Venezuela BIT in order to comply with the nationality requirement of 
the ICSID Convention. Despite the fact that they are controlled by a Dutch 
national, the four claimants could not be considered as Dutch nationals for the 
purposes of the ICSID Convention, once they were not incorporated nor had their 
seat in the Netherlands. 
In its decision, the Mobil tribunal rejected Venezuela’s contention. 
According to the tribunal, “Article 25 fixes the ‘outer limits’ of ICSID jurisdiction 
                                                 
4 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Venezuela of October 22, 1991, 1788 
UNTS 70 (entered into force September 14, 1993). 
5 Article 1(b) of the Netherland-Venezuela BIT provides that: 
For the purposes of this Agreement: 
[…] 
(b) The term ‘nationals’ shall comprise with regard to either 
Contracting Party: 
i. natural persons having the nationality of that Contracting Party; 
ii. legal persons constituted under the law of that Contracting 
Party; 
iii. legal persons not constituted under the law of that Contracting 
Party but controlled, directly or indirectly, by natural persons as 
defined in (i) or by legal persons as defined in (ii) above. 
1788 UNTS 70, 71. 
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and that parties can consent to that jurisdiction only within those limits.”6 Once the 
ICSID Convention does not expressly provide for any specific criterion for the 
nationality of juridical persons not having the nationality of the host State, the 
tribunal considered that the Netherlands and Venezuela “were free to consider as 
nationals both the legal persons constituted under the law of one of the Parties and 
those constituted under another law, but controlled by such legal persons.”7 
 It is submitted in this paper, however, that the interpretation given by the 
Mobil tribunal to the ICSID Convention is inconsistent with the general rule of 
treaty interpretation set for the in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“Vienna Convention”).8 While this would not change the outcome of the decision, 
given that the four claimants were in fact nationals of Contracting States of the 
ICSID Convention, the ICSID Convention does not confer on its Contracting 
States the discretion to provide for a nationality criterion other than the place of 
incorporation or seat test.  
 
II. THE NATIONALITY REQUIREMENT OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 
 
One the peculiarities of arbitral proceedings instituted under the auspices 
of the Centre is that the Centre is an international organization and, thus, its 
functions are limited by its constitutive treaty; the ICSID Convention. This 
peculiarity distinguishes the Centre from other arbitral institutions, to the extent 
that the Centre may only exercise its jurisdiction and institute arbitral proceedings 
within the limits set out in the ICSID Convention. To this effect, Article 25(1) of 
the ICSID Convention provides that: 
 
                                                 
6 Mobil Corporation, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27 at 42. 
7 Id. 
8 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, reprinted 
in 8 ILM 679 (1969) (entered into force January 27, 1980). 
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The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal 
dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a 
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency 
of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) 
and a national of another Contracting State, which the 
parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the 
Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party 
may withdraw its consent unilaterally.9  
 
The nationality requirement set forth in Article 25(1) (“a national of another 
Contracting State”) was envisaged to serve a twofold purpose. First, it seeks to 
prevent the submission to the jurisdiction of the Centre of disputes between a 
Contracting State and its own nationals. Secondly, the nationality of a Contracting 
State, excluding nationals of third States, is an element of the self-contained 
regime of the dispute settlement system established by the ICSID Convention. This 
self-contained regime creates obligation to all Contracting States of the ICSID 
Convention and not only to the disputing parties and aims at isolating arbitral 
proceedings under the ICSID Convention from the interference of domestic 
courts.10 Article 26 of the ICSID Convention provides that “[c]onsent of the parties 
to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed 
consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy.”11 Article 27(1) of 
the ICSID Convention provides further that: 
 
No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or 
bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute which 
one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have 
consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration 
                                                 
9 1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 9 (emphasis added). 
10 SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 3, at 351-52. 
11 1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 10. 
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under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State 
shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award 
rendered in such dispute.12 
 
The ICSID Convention also imposes obligations to all Contracting States in 
respect of the effectiveness of arbitral awards rendered by ICSID tribunals. First, 
pursuant to Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention, “[t]he award shall be binding 
on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except 
those provided for in this Convention.”13 In addition, Article 54(1) of the ICSID 
Convention provides that “[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an award 
rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary 
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final 
judgment of a court in that State.”14  
All these provisions, which are the basis of the self-contained regime 
envisaged by the ICSID Convention, were meant to isolate ICSID arbitral 
proceedings from the interference of domestic courts and from the political 
character of claims espoused under diplomatic protection. Hence, if third States 
and their nationals were allowed to take part in ICSID arbitrations, the self-
contained regime would be endangered, to the extent that third States are not 
bound by the rules of the ICSID Convention.15 
                                                 
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 17. 
14 Id.  
15 The Centre is allowed to administer arbitral proceedings between a Contracting State and 
a national of a non-Contracting State, or between a non-Contracting State and a national of 
a Contracting State under the Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the 
Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (“ICSID Additional Facility Rules”). Pursuant to Article 2(a) of the 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules: 
The Secretariat of the Centre is hereby authorized to administer, 
subject to and in accordance with these Rules, proceedings 
between a State (or a constituent subdivision or agency of a State) 
and a national of another State, falling within the following 
categories: 
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III. THE NATIONALITY OF JURIDICAL PERSONS UNDER THE ICSID 
 CONVENTION 
 
The nationality of natural and juridical persons plays a central role in the 
jurisdiction of the Centre. As seen above, Article 25(1) provides that the 
jurisdiction of the Centre is limited to disputes between “a Contracting State (or 
any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the 
Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State.”16 The ICSID 
Convention, however, does not contain any rule that expressly sets forth the 
criteria by virtue of which the nationality of natural or juridical persons is to be 
determined. Except for the case of locally incorporated companies, the ICSID 
Convention imposes only negative requirements on the nationality of juridical 
persons. In this sense, pursuant to Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention: 
 




(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a 
Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute on 
                                                                                                                            
(a) conciliation and arbitration proceedings for the settlement of legal 
disputes arising directly out of an investment which are not within 
the jurisdiction of the Centre because either the State party to the 
dispute or the State whose national is a party to the dispute is not a 
Contracting State  
1 ICSID Reports 217 (1993), at 218.  
Arbitral proceedings instituted under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, however, operate 
outside the rules of the ICSID Convention and, thus, they do not benefit from the self-
contained regime of the ICSID dispute settlement system. In this sense, Article 3 of the 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules provides that: 
Since the proceedings envisaged by Article 2 are outside the 
jurisdiction of the Centre, none of the provisions of the Convention 
shall be applicable to them or to recommendations, awards, or 
reports which may be rendered therein. 
1 ICSID Reports 217 (1993), at 218. 
16 Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
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the date on which the parties consented to submit such 
dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any juridical person 
which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to 
the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign 
control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a 
national of another Contracting State for the purposes of this 
Convention.17 
 
But while Article 25(2)(b) does not set forth a general criterion for the 
determination of the nationality of the juridical person, a systematic interpretation 
of the provision infers the intention to confer the nationality of the State in which 
the juridical person is incorporated or has its seat. This interpretation is based on 
the fact that the second clause of Article 25(2)(b) attributes to the juridical person 
the nationality of the Contracting State party to dispute, but allows the application 
of the control test in cases where the disputing parties agree to confer on the 
juridical person the nationality of another Contracting State upon the existence of 
foreign control. The control test, based on the nationality of the controllers of the 
juridical person, is the exception.18 
Since the famous decision of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in 
the Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited 
(“Barcelona Traction”), the place of incorporation or seat test has been considered 
the general rule existing in public international law governing the nationality of 
juridical persons. In the case, which concerned the exercise of diplomatic 
                                                 
17 Id. at 9-10. 
18 SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 3, at 279-80. The First Preliminary Draft of the ICSID 
Convention of August 9, 1963, defined the term “national of a Contracting State” as “(a) 
any company which under the domestic law of that State is its national, and (b) any 
company in which the nationals of that State have a controlling interest” (History of the 
ICSID Convention: Documents Concerning the Origin and Formulation of the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, v. 
II, at 170 (1968) (emphasis added)). The Preliminary Draft of the ICSID Convention of 
October 15, 1963, contained the same definition, id. at 230, but it was excluded in the First 
Draft of the ICSID Convention of September 11, 1964, id. at 624. 
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protection of a juridical person incorporated in Canada but owned and controlled 
by Belgian shareholders, the ICJ decided that Belgium was not entitled to spouse 
the claim of the company regardless of the Belgian nationality of its shareholders. 
According to the ICJ:  
 
In allocating corporate entities to States for purposes of 
diplomatic protection, international law is based, but only to 
a limited extent, on an analogy with the rules governing the 
nationality of individuals. The traditional rule attributes the 
right of diplomatic protection of a corporate entity to the 
State under the laws of which it is incorporated and in whose 
territory it has its registered office. These two criteria have 
been confirmed by long practice and by numerous 
international instruments. […].19 
 
The existence, in public international law, of a rule entailing the place of 
incorporation or seat test was also recognized by the International Law 
Commission in the 2006 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, according to 
which: 
 
                                                 
19 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium 
v. Spain) (New application: 1962), Judgment of February 5, 1970, ICJ Reports 3 (1970), at 
43. 
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Article 9  
State of nationality of a corporation 
 
For the purposes of the diplomatic protection of a 
corporation, the State of nationality means the State under 
whose law the corporation was incorporated. However, when 
the corporation is controlled by nationals of another State or 
States and has no substantial business activities in the State 
of incorporation, and the seat of management and the 
financial control of the corporation are both located in 
another State, that State shall be regarded as the State of 
nationality.20 
 
But while the place of incorporation or seat test became the prevailing criterion in 
public international law, ICSID writers have argued that this rule does not prevent 
the use of other nationality criteria, including the control test, for the determination 
of the nationality of juridical persons pursuant to the first clause of Article 25(2)(b) 
of the ICSID Convention. Among them, Aron Broches, who designed and 
conducted the drafting process of the ICSID Convention, advocated a flexible 
approach towards the nationality requirement of juridical persons. According to 
him, the decision given in the Barcelona Traction case referred to a dispute 
involving the exercise of diplomatic protection in favor of a company and, 
therefore, it should not be automatically applied in cases submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the Centre. Broches argued that: 
 
The purpose of [Article 25(2)(b)], as well as of Article 25(1), 
is to indicate the outer limits within which disputes may be 
                                                 
20 International Law Commission Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006), available 
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_8_2006.pdf (last 
visited on Feb 13, 2011).  
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submitted to conciliation or arbitration under the auspices of 
the Centre with the consent of the parties thereto. Therefore 
the parties should be given the widest possible latitude to 
agree on the meaning of “nationality” and any stipulation of 
nationality made in connection with a conciliation or 
arbitration clause which is based on a reasonable criterion 
should be accepted. In order to avoid uncertainty or 
unpleasant surprises in case of a challenge to the jurisdiction 
of the Centre, it is clearly desirable that whenever a company 
is not incorporated under the laws of a Contracting State to 
stipulate the nationality which that company is to have for 
the purposes of the Convention. In the absence of such a 
stipulation, a Commission or Tribunal will have to 
pronounce itself in case of a disputed nationality. I submit 
that in such a case which, I repeat, would not involve the 
issue of diplomatic protection but merely that of the outer 
limits within which parties may agree to submit disputes to 
the Centre, the decision in Barcelona Traction should not be 
regarded as controlling. When a Commission or Tribunal is 
faced with a challenge only if not to do so would permit 
parties to use the Convention for purposes for which it was 
clearly not intended. That is to say that the Commission or 
Tribunal should favour giving effect to the agreement 
between the parties by adopting a more functional approach, 
taking into account not only formal criteria such as 
incorporation ― as Judge Riphagen said in his dissenting 
opinion in the Barcelon Traction Case, ‘A true bond of 
nationality such as exists between a State and its nationals 
who natural persons, is obviously inconceivable for juristic 
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persons as such’ ― but adopting a broader approach which 
would give effect to economic realities such as ownership 
and control.21 
 
The flexible approach advocated by Broches was also supported by C. F. 
Amerasinghe. Like Broches, Amerasinghe based his position on the idea that the 
place of incorporation or seat test as the only nationality criterion admitted in 
public international law is limited to cases involving the exercise of diplomatic 
protection in favor of juridical persons. Amerasinghe also sustained the application 
of the control test for the purposes of establishing the jurisdiction of the Centre, 
once such criterion is not expressly excluded by Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID 
Convention. According to Amerasinghe: 
 
It should have emerged from the above analysis that the 
question of nationality of juridical persons for the purpose of 
the Centre’s jurisdiction can be dealt with by a tribunal or 
commission in extremely flexible terms and particularly 
because it is not bound by the law of diplomatic protection in 
this regard. The nationality of a juridical person under the 
Convention can be seen in the light of a broad definition 
which requires some adequate connection between the 
juridical person and a State. There may be more than one 
State in respect of which such connection could reasonably 
be established. The travaux préparatoires do not require a 
different approach. A second proposition that may be 
adhered to in the interpretation of the Convention is that 
every effort should be made to give the Centre jurisdiction 
by the application of the flexible approach, within the broad 
                                                 
21 Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 331, 360-61 (1972). 
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definition of nationality, and to the extent that possibilities 
are not explicitly excluded by the Convention itself. This 
does not mean that a tribunal or commission may 
indiscriminately hold that it has jurisdiction on the ground 
that a juridical person has the nationality of another 
Contracting State and does not initially have the nationality 
of the host State. In every case where it is held that there is 
jurisdiction on these grounds there would have to be a 
rational justification based on acceptable criteria.22 
 
According to the flexible approach advocated by Broches and Amerasinghe, the 
disputing parties have the discretion to adopt a nationality criterion other than the 
place of incorporation or seat test. And as consequence of this approach, ICSID 
tribunals could rely on the nationality criteria set forth in international investment 
treaties in assessing the fulfillment of the nationality requirement of the ICSID 
Convention.  
Other ICSID writers have disagreed, however, with the flexible approach 
advocated by Broches and Amerasinghe and with the use of the control test 
pursuant to the first clause of Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention. MOSHE 
HIRSCH, for instance, argued that the ICSID Convention does not confer absolute 
freedom on the disputing parties to choose among different nationality criteria. 
According to HIRSCH, the interpretation of the ICSID Convention should take into 
account the relevant rules of public international law, which do not allow a flexible 
approach in the determination of the nationality of juridical persons.23 For the same 
reason, the control test, rejected by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, would 
also not be an available nationality criterion. As Hirsch pointed out: 
                                                 
22 C.F. Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction Ratione Personae under the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 47 28 
BRIT. Y. B. I. L. 227, 259 (1974/75). 
23 See MOSHE HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE 
FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 85 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993). 




In our view, the formulation of Article 25(2)(b) of the 
Convention implies that the drafters of the Convention did 
not intend to include the criterion of control for the purpose 
of determining corporate nationality. If should, however, be 
mentioned that it is sometimes necessary to modify the 
interpretation of treaty provisions in accordance with the 
subsequent practice of the parties in their application of the 
treaty. An outstanding expression of this approach is the case 
concerning South West Africa, in which the International 
Court ruled that an international instrument must be 
interpreted within the complete framework prevailing at the 
time of interpretation. It may be that the increasing recourse 
to the criterion of control by states and international 
organizations in recent years leads to an interpretation of the 
Convention in a manner which differs from that anticipated 
by its drafters, but which adapts it to the new state of the 
law. Despite the growing trend to recognize the criterion of 
control as a possible basis for identifying the nationality of a 
corporation, it is doubtful whether one can state categorically 
that this criterion is, indeed, today accepted in international 
law alongside the criteria of incorporation and seat. We may 
now be in a period of transition in this sphere, and it is 
premature to state with certainty how the law relating to 
corporate nationality will take shape in the coming years.24 
 
But while the use of the control test as a nationality criterion in the first clause of 
Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention remained controversial, until the Mobil 
                                                 
24 Id. at 90-91 (internal citations omitted).  
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decision no ICSID tribunal had ever rendered a decision expressly allowing or 
disallowing the application of the control test. Before the Mobil case, the issue was 
raised in the case of Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Guinea. 
(“MINE”), but no decision was given on this question. In the MINE case, the 
claimant, a juridical person incorporated in Liechtenstein, which was not a 
Contracting State of the ICSID Convention, was considered upon the agreement of 
the parties a national of Switzerland, a Contracting State of the ICSID Convention, 
because of Swiss control. The issue, however, was not addressed by the tribunal, 
given that Guinea decided not to put forward any objection to the jurisdiction of 
the Centre.25  
 
IV. NATIONALITY UNDER THE ICSID CONVENTION AND NATIONALITY UNDER 
THE BIT 
 
The scarcity of decisions dealing with the use of the control test for the 
purposes of establishing the jurisdiction of the Centre may be explained by the fact 
that most international investment treaties providing for ICSID arbitration adopt 
the place of incorporation or seat test as the governing nationality criterion. Only a 
few international investment treaties, such as the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT, 
provide for the control test.26 Hence, in most cases, the nationality of the juridical 
person will be assessed in accordance with the place of incorporation or seat test, 
and ICSID tribunals will not be required to address the question as to whether the 
ICSID Convention allows the disputing parties to rely on the control test in the 
first clause of Article 25(2)(b). 
But the peculiarity of the Mobil case lies in fact that while the four 
claimants could only fulfill the nationality requirement of the Netherlands-
                                                 
25 Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/4, Award of January 6, 1988, 4 ICSID Reports 61 (1997); See also HIRSCH, supra 
note 23, at 87-89; SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 3, at 284-85. 
26 KENNETH VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND 
INTERPRETATION 159-60 (Oxford University Press 2010). 
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Venezuela BIT claiming that they were under Dutch control, they were, pursuant 
to the place of incorporation or seat test, nationals of Contracting States of the 
ICSID Convention, the Bahamas and the United States. Accordingly, even if the 
Mobil tribunal had relied on the place of incorporation or seat test in assessing the 
compliance with the nationality requirement of the ICSID Convention, regardless 
of the nationality of the four claimants under the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT, the 
outcome of the decision would have been the same. 
The distinction between the nationality under the ICSID Convention and 
the nationality under the BIT comes from the fact that the nationality requirements 
set forth in the ICSID Convention and in the BIT serve different purposes. Under 
the ICSID Convention, the nationality requirement is aimed at defining the 
extension of the jurisdiction of the Centre. Pursuant to Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention, the Centre may only institute arbitral or conciliation proceedings in 
disputes between “a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of 
a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
Contracting State.” On the other hand, the nationality requirement of the BIT 
defines the scope of application of the BIT and its function is not to alter or 
supplement the ICSID Convention. For the purposes of the ICSID Convention, the 
relevance of the fulfillment of the requirements set forth in the BIT is limited to the 
assessment of the question as to whether the dispute falls within the consent given 
by the disputing parties to the jurisdiction of the Centre.  
Accordingly, even if the Mobil tribunal had applied the place of 
incorporation or seat test in order to determine the nationality of the four claimants 
for the purposes of the ICSID Convention, the dispute would still have been within 
the jurisdiction, despite their Dutch nationality under the BIT. The nationality 
requirement of the ICSID Convention would be met due to the incorporation of the 
four claimants in the Bahamas and in the United States, at the same time that the 
nationality requirement of the BIT would be complied with, given that the 
claimants were controlled by a Dutch national.  
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But the reasoning adopted in the Mobil decision, sustaining the freedom of 
the parties to choose a nationality criterion other than the place of incorporation or 
seat test, would also allow the submission to the jurisdiction of the Centre of 
disputes where the nationality of a Contracting State could only be determined 
pursuant to the control test. In this situation, the question as to whether the first 
clause of Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention admits the use of the control 
test becomes relevant.  
 
V. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 25(2)(B) OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 
 
The use of the control test in order to determine the nationality of juridical 
persons under the first clause of the Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention is 
contingent upon the interpretation given to the term “nationality” as employed in 
this provision. In other words, it must be established the meaning of the term 
“nationality” for the purposes of defining how a juridical person is considered to 
be a national of a given State.  
As an international treaty, the ICSID Convention must be interpreted in 
accordance with the Vienna Convention, which codified the rules of treaty 
interpretation existing in customary international law.27 Pursuant to the general rule 
                                                 
27 The rules of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention were recognized by the ICJ 
as the codification of the existing customary international law on law of treaties. In this 
sense, in the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 case, the ICJ observed that the principles of 
treaty interpretation “are reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, which may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing 
customary international law on the point” (Judgment of November 12, 1991, ICJ Reports 
53, at 70); See also Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and 
Bahrain, Judgment of February 15, 1995, ICJ Reports 6, at 18; Oil Platforms, Judgment of 
December 12, 1996, ICJ Reports 803, at 812; Kasikili/Sedudu Island, Judgment of 
December 13, 1999, ICJ Reports 1045, at 1059; Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau 
Sipadan, Judgment of December 17, 2002, ICJ Reports 625 at 645; Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals, Judgment of March 31, 2004, ICJ Reports 12 at 48; Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion of July 9, 2004, ICJ Reports 136 at 174; Legality of Use of Force, 
Judgment of December 15, 2004, ICJ Reports 1160 at 1199. For an analysis of the 
recognition by the ICJ of the customary international law status of the rules of treaty 
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of treaty interpretation contained in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, “[a] 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”28 The reference to the “context” in which “terms of the treaty” are 
employed entails the application of the so-called principle of integration. Pursuant 
to such principle, the search for correct meaning of the terms of a treaty is not 
limited to determining the ordinary meaning of a term, in isolation. The treaty must 
be interpreted as whole, taken into account the wording of the provision where the 
term is employed, all provisions of the treaty as a unit, and other elements that 
form the context of the terms of the treaty for the purposes of interpretation.29 
                                                                                                                            
interpretation of the Vienna Convention, see Santiago Torres Bernárdez, Interpretation of 
Treaties by the International Court of Justice Following the Adoption of the 1989 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, in LIBER AMICORUM PROFESSOR SEIDL-
HOHENVELDERN – IN HONOUR OF HIS 80TH BIRTHDAY 721 (Gerhard Hafner, et al., eds., The 
Hague Kluwer Law International 1998); RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 
13-17 (Oxford University Press 2008).  In the Territorial Dispute case, between Libya and 
Chad, the ICJ applied the rules of treaty interpretation embodied in the Vienna Convention 
to a treaty concluded in 1955 on the basis that they were the existing international 
customary law rules of treaty interpretation (Judgment of February 3, 1994, ICJ Reports 6, 
at 21-22). This decision confirms the idea that in 1965, when the ICSID Convention was 
concluded, the rules of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention had the status of 
customary international law and, for this reason, they are applicable to the interpretation of 
the ICSID Convention (See D.W. GREIG, INTERTEMPORALITY AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 
111 (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2001); See also Dispute 
Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, Judgment of July 13, 2009, 48 ILM 1183, at 
1200; Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 
Judgment of April 20, 2010, para. 65, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf (last visited May 4, 2010). 
28 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 115 UNTS 331, reprinted in 8 
ILM 679 at 691-692 (1969) (emphasis added). 
29 The principle of integration was defined by G. Fitzmaurice as follows: 
“Principle of Integration. Treaties are to be interpreted as a whole, 
and with reference to their declared or apparent objects, purposes, 
and principles”  
G.G., Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty 
Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y. B. I. L. 1, 9 (1951). 
The elements that define the context of the terms of a treaty for the purposes of 
interpretation are set forth in Articles 31(2) and (3) of the Vienna Convention, which 
provides that: 
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Accordingly, the term “nationality”, as employed in the first clause of Article 
25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention, may not be construed without taking into 
consideration the whole wording of the provision and the other provisions of the 
ICSID Convention. 
 The first element of the context of term “nationality” is the wording of the 
second clause of Article 25(2)(b). As mentioned before, Article 25(2)(b) does not 
provide for any specific criterion for the determination of the nationality of 
juridical persons, but its second clause allows the disputing parties to agree to 
confer on the juridical person that has the nationality of the Contracting State party 
to the dispute the nationality of another Contracting State because of foreign 
control. This exception constitutes strong evidence of the intention envisaged in 
the ICSID Convention to confer on the place of incorporation or seat test the status 
of a general rule governing the nationality of juridical persons for jurisdictional 
purposes. It implies that the juridical person has nationality of the Contracting 
State party to the dispute because of the place of incorporation or seat, but, as an 
exception, the disputing parties may agree to confer on the juridical person a 
different nationality pursuant to the control test. 
                                                                                                                            
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and 
annexes:  
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between 
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the 
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 115 UNTS 331, reprinted in 8 
ILM 679, 692 (1969). 
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This interpretation is also confirmed taking into account another element 
of the context of the term “nationality”. Pursuant to the Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention, “[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the context 
[…]any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.”30 The relevant rules existing in customary international law suggests that 
the only nationality criterion available in public international law is the place of the 
incorporation or seat test, as recognized by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case. 
Nevertheless, Broches and Amerasinghe, who advocated the use of 
nationality criteria other than the place of incorporation or seat test, including the 
control test, based their position on the idea that, while the second clause of Article 
25(2)(b) implies the place of incorporation or seat test, Article 25(2)(b) does not 
exclude the use of other nationality criteria in order to determine the nationality of 
juridical persons that do not have the nationality of the Contracting State party to 
the dispute pursuant to the place of incorporation or seat test. These writers also 
argued that the rule defined by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case is limited to 
cases involving the exercise of diplomatic protection in favor of juridical persons 
and it should not be automatically applied in cases submitted to the jurisdiction of 
the Centre. This argument, according to them, is based on the idea that the 
conclusion of the ICSID Convention aimed at establishing a dispute settlement 
system that departs from the traditional diplomatic protection practice and, 
therefore, the rules developed and applied in diplomatic protection cases should 
not place restrictions on the jurisdiction of the Centre.  
 The idea that the ICSID Convention aimed at establishing a system 
disconnected from the rules developed in diplomatic protection practice seems, 
however, inconsistent with the ICSID Convention itself, given that the ICSID 
Convention does not operate in isolation from the rules of diplomatic protection. 
As mentioned above, one of the rules designed to create the self-contained regime 
of the ICSID Convention is contained in its Article 27(1). This rule prevents a 
                                                 
30 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 115 UNTS 331, reprinted in 8 
ILM 679, 692 (1969). 
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Contracting State from exercising diplomatic protection if one of its nationals and 
another Contracting State consented to submit the dispute to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre. Article 27(1), accordingly, infers the existence of a nationality criterion 
that allows the Contracting State to exercise diplomatic protection in favor a 
national. This nationality criterion is the place of incorporation or seat test and not 
the control test, which is not admitted in diplomatic protection.  
 The consequence of the implied nationality criterion in Article 27(1) is 
that, if the first clause of Article 25(2)(b) admitted the control test, the ICSID 
Convention would contain a contradiction between these two provisions. The term 
“nationality” in the first clause of Article 25(2)(b) would cover not only juridical 
persons incorporated or that have the seat in a Contracting State, but those that are 
controlled by nationals of the Contracting State. On the other hand, the term 
“nationals” in Article 27(1) would cover juridical persons that are incorporated or 
have the seat in a Contracting State, but not those that are controlled by nationals 
of the Contracting State. Likewise, following the interpretation given by the Mobil 
tribunal to the nationality requirement of the ICSID Convention, the nationality of 
juridical persons under the first clause of Article 25(2)(b) would be an element of 
the autonomy of the disputing parties, while in Article 27(1) it would be a 
requirement that could not be waived by the will of the parties. 
 The contradiction that would result from the use of the control test in the 
first clause of Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention militates against the 
flexible approach adopted in the Mobil decision. As mentioned before, one of the 
controlling principles contained in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention is the 
so-called principle of integration. Pursuant to this principle, for the purposes of 
interpretation, a treaty forms a unit and must be interpreted accordingly, as a 
whole, and its terms may not be construed in isolation. As a consequence, a term 
used in different occasions in a treaty must be assumed to have a consistent 
meaning through out the whole treaty, avoiding any internal contradiction between 
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its provisions.31 In this sense, in interpreting the first clause of Article 25(2)(b) of 
the ICSID Convention, one must assume that the term “nationality” was meant to 
have the same meaning through out the whole ICSID Convention and that there is 
no contradiction between its provisions. 
 The misinterpretation given by the Mobil tribunal lies in the fact that it 
failed to look at the ICSID Convention as whole, especially at Article 27(1). The 
existence of a criterion in Article 27(1) governing the nationality of juridical 
persons pursuant to the place of incorporation or seat test prevents ICSID tribunals 
from relying on the control test for the purposes of establishing the jurisdiction of 
the Centre. Like in Article 27(1), the nationality of juridical persons as a 
jurisdictional requirement is not an element of the autonomy of the disputing 
parties that could be waived by the will of the disputing parties.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
This article sought to demonstrate that the decision on jurisdiction 
rendered in the Mobil case was based on a misinterpretation of the nationality 
requirement of the ICSID Convention. Contrary to what the tribunal pointed out, 
the ICSID Convention does not allow the application of a nationality criterion 
other than the place of incorporation or seat test in order to define the nationality of 
juridical persons. This conclusion is reached on the basis of the rules of treaty 
interpretation embodied in the Vienna Convention. The nationality requirement is 
one of the elements that form the self-contained regime envisaged by the ICSID 
Convention and is not dictated by the autonomy of the disputing parties. 
                                                 
31 See GYÖRGY HARASZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF TREATIES 108 
(Jozsef Decsenyi, trans., Akadémiai Kiadó 1973); ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, 
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1273, n.12 (Longman, 9th ed., 1992); ULF 
LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AS EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 106-107 
(Springer 2007). 
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 Nevertheless, despite the misinterpretation given by the Mobil tribunal to 
the ICSID Convention, the outcome of the decision would have been the same if 
the tribunal had applied the place of incorporation or seat test in order to assess the 
fulfillment of the nationality requirement of the ICSID Convention. Even though 
the four claimants against which Venezuela challenged the jurisdiction of the 
Centre would not qualify as Dutch nationals under the ICSID Convention, they 
were, in fact, nationals of Contracting States, the United States and the Bahamas, 
where they were incorporated. 
